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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
No. 14503 
JUNE MARLENE THOMAS, 
Pla int i f f -Respondent , 
v s . 
HARRY EDWARD THOMAS, 
Defendant-Appel lant , 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was sentenced for contempt for fai lure to obey an order 
requiring h im to deliver certain trading stock to his e x - w i f e . Defendant had 
earl ier been found innocent of a contempt charge for fai lure to deliver that same 
stock to his ex -w i fe as ordered by the divorce decree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Court entered minute entry and memorandum decision without for-
mal f ind ings, conclusions of law or judgment and sentenced defendant to thir ty 
(30) days in ja i l for contempt of Court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have f inding of contempt and ja i l sentence vaca-
i 
t ed , or that f a i l i ng , to have the ja i l sentence reduced. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced in 1970. The divorce decree provided, 
among other th ings, that p la int i f f was awarded 10 shares of Ute Distr ibut ion 
Corporation s tock, ( R . 27, Par. # 3 ) , and that defendant was ordered to d e l i -
ver that stock to p la in t i f f . P la in t i f f brought an order to show cause in March, 
1974, ( R . 47, Par. 5 ) , charging defendant wi th contempt for his fa i lure to de-
l iver those 10 shares of stock to p la int i f f as ordered by the divorce decree.
 ( 
After hearing evidence the Court found that defendant had not del ivered the 10 
shares of stock to p la in t i f f , but that he was not in contempt of Court ( R . 6 4 ) , 
and by minute entry again ordered defendant to del iver that same 10 shares of 
stock to p la int i f f w i th in 10 days after entry of the order ( R . 6 5 ) . That decision 
was reduced to wr i t ing January, 1975, which then ordered defendant to i m m e - , 
diately del iver that stock to p la in t i f f . There was no f inding by the Court that 
defendant had the ab i l i t y to del iver that s tock . Defendant moved for an order 
s t r ik ing the Cour t 's order requiring the del ivery of that stock ( R . 7 3 ) , at which 
hearing the Court ordered that M . . . p la int i f f is ent i t led to the distr ibut ion of 
the stock in accordance w i th the decree of divorce on f i l e , " (emphasis added) . 
Thereafter by minute entry the Court denied the motion to amend, ( R . 8 0 ) , 
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however an order was thereafter prepared by counsel for p la int i f f and f i l ed amen-
ding those f indings to provide that p la int i f f had not waived her right to receive 
the Ute Dist r ibut ion Stock in exchange for a boat, motorcycle and snow machine 
as c la imed by defendant ( R . 8 2 ) . 
In September, 1975, and again in December, 1975, (R . 86-90) 
p la int i f f brought orders to show cause charging defendant w i th contempt of Court 
for fa i lure to del iver the same 10 shares of Ute Distr ibut ion Stock. Judge Croft 
found that Titan Corporation, an organization control led by de fendants brothers, 
and of which his daughter was secretary, held 10 shares of Ute Distr ibut ion 
Stock during the period f rom February 4 , 1975, to February 20, 1975, after Judge 
Leary fs order of January 3, 1975, but did not f ind that defendant owned that 
s tock , had control over that s tock, or had ab i l i t y to del iver that stock to p la in -
t i f f . Judge Croft then determined that the defendant was gui l ty of contempt 
of Court for fa i lure to del iver sa id 10 shares of Ute Dist r ibut ion Stock to p la in -
t i f f ( R . 99 -100) , and thereafter sentenced defendant to 30 days in the County 
Jai l for that contempt. Defendant tes t i f ied that he was f inancia l ly unable to pur-
chase stock to del iver and that he did not have stock of his own or access to 
stock owned by Titan Corporation which he could del iver to pla int i f f to comply 
w i th the order of Judge Leary ( R . ) . No f inding was made that defendant 
was able to comply w i th the order of Judge Leary requiring delivery of the s tock. 
No Findings of Fact (other than those contained in the informal m i n -
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ute entry - R. 94-100) were ever signed of f i l e d , no Conclusions of Law were 
signed or f i l e d , and no Judgment was ever entered or signed concerning the 
contempt discussed in that memorandum dec is ion . Judge Croft sentenced de-
fendant to 30 days in j a i l , the max imum ja i l sentence permit ted under the pro-
visions of 78 -32-9 , UCA, 1953. i 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I ' 
SINCE THERE ARE NO WRITTEN FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, OR JUDGMENT, 
THERE IS NO PROPER FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT A SENTENCE FOR CON-
i 
TEMPT AGAINST DEFENDANT, AND THEREFORE SAID SENTENCE MUST 
BE VACATED. 
It is f i rm ly establ ished that Utah Law requires wri t ten f indings of 
fac t , conclusions of law and a wri t ten judgment reci t ing facts and conclusions 
upon which the Court based its opinion before any judgment of contempt can 
be upheld. Nei lson v . Dennett, 22 U. (2d) 166, 450 P . 2d 93 (1969) ; Powers 
v . Taylor, 14 U. (2d) 118, 378 P . 2d 519 (1963) ; Brown v . Cook, 123 U. 
505, 260 P. 2d 544 (1953) ; Parr ish v . McConk ie , 89 U. 396, 35 P . 2d 1001 ' 
(1934) ; Hinkins v . San t i , 25 U. (2d) 324, 481 P. 2d 53; Adams v . Adams, 
30 U. (2d) 121, 514 P. 2d 536 (1973) . 
In th is case the defendant was held in contempt of Court for v io la -
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t ing a previous order of the Court and was sentenced to serve th i r ty days in 
ja i l ( R . 100-101) without any wri t ten f ind ings, conclusions or judgment. The 
reasoning of the Court is evidenced only by the memorandum decision of the 
Court ( R . 94 -100) , which s imp ly does not meet the requirements of Utah Law. 
A minute entry does not const i tute a judgment. Robison v . F i l lmore Commer-
cia l & Savings Bank, 61 U. 398, 213 P. 790; Lukich v . Utah Const. C o . , 46 
U. 317, 150 P . 298. An appeal l ies only f rom a judgment and not f rom a m i n -
ute entry or memorandum dec is ion . E l l i n w o o d v . Bennion, 73 U. 563, 276 
P. 159; Rule 7 2 ( a ) , URCP. 
In Powers v . Taylor, 14 U. (2d) 118, 378 P. 2d 519 (1963) the 
Utah Supreme Court stated in part as fo l l ows : 
"Unfortunately form the standpoint of the va l id i ty of the ' 
judgment, perhaps fortunately f rom the viewpoint of the de-
fendant, no wr i t ten f indings as such were made. . . . 
" . . . T h e essence of contempt of court is the w i l fu l d isre-
gard or disobedience of its orders ( (cases c i t e d ) ) . Inasmuch 
as it is punishable by the tradi t ional c r imina l sanctions of f ine 
and impr ixonment, it partakes of the nature of c r imina l 
proceedings and is somet imes referred to as quas i -c r imina l 
( (cases c i t e d ) ) . Because of th is it is essential that the rights of 
one so accused be careful ly safeguarded. He must be ap-
prised of the nature of the accusat ion; afforded an oppor-
tuni ty to meet i t ; and in order to just i fy a f inding and sentence 
for contempt the proof should be clear and sat isfactory that 
the contempter was in v io lat ion or defiance of the cour t ' s 
order ( (cases c i t e d ) ) . When this is done it is necessary 
for the court to make wri t ten f indings upon the speci f ic con-
duct found to be contemptuous, and draw its conclusions 
and enter judgment thereon ((cases c i t e d ) ) . As above 
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indicated, the court made no wri t ten f indings as such and . 
the recitals contained in the "Judgment" were inconsistent 
wi th the express declarations by the court as to any contempt 
that may have existed ( (cases c i t e d ) ) . It is therefore e v i - , 
dent that there is no proper foundation to support a judgment 
of contempt. Accord ing ly , it must be, and is hereby va-
ca ted . " (Emphasis added) . 
POINT II , 
THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS ABLE TO 
DELIVER THE STOCK, WHICH FINDING IS ESSENTIAL TO A FINDING OF 
I 
CONTEMPT. 
Even had the Court properly reduced the thoughts contained in its 
memorandum decision ( R . 94-100) to f indings of fac t , conclusions of law and < 
judgment as required by Rule 5 2 ( a ) , URCP, there would be no foundation to 
support a judgment of contempt s ince the Court fa i led to make a f inding of fact 
i 
( i n i ts memorandum decis ion) that defendant had the ab i l i ty to deliver the stock 
and to thereby comply w i th the order concerning which he was held in contempt 
of court . Accord ingly , such a judgment would be vo id . State v . Bartholomew, 1 
85 U. 94, 38 P. 2d 753; H i l l yard v . D is t r ic t Court of Cache County, 68 U. 
220, 249 P . 806; Watson v . Watson, 72 U. 218, 269 P. 775; Powers v . Tay-
lor, 14 U. (2d) 118, 378 P. 2d 519. See also A m . Jur. 2d Contempt Sec. 
5 1 , 100, 111 , (Volume 17 ) . 
Inabi l i ty to comply wi th the court order is a complete defease to < 
a charge of contempt of court , unless that ab i l i ty has been lost through the 
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defendant 's own act ions. The memorandum decision des cusses some evidence 
and inferences to the effect that defendant might have the abi l i ty to control 
Titan Corporation and to require its stock to be delivered to p la in t i f f , however 
no such f inding is made by the Court. In any event, such a f inding must be 
establ ished by proof which is "c lear and sat isfactory that the contempter was 
in v io lat ion or defiance of the cour t ' s order". Powers v . Taylor, 14 U. (2d) 
118, 378 P. 2d 519. The inferences in Judge Cro f t ' s discussion does not r ise 
to meet the "Clear and sat is factory" burden of proof required for a contempt 
conv ic t ion . 
POINT III 
IMPOSITION OF 30 DAY JAIL SENTENCE WAS TOO S E V E R E . 
The max imum ja i l sentence permit ted under 78-32-10, UCA, 1953, 
for contempt of court is 30 days. Such a severe penalty must be jus t i f ied by 
the circumstances if it is to withstand scruteny. Whi le the amount of penalty 
for contempt should rest w i th in the sound discret ion of the t r ia l Court, it is 
not without l im i ta t ion and must be exercised wi th in the confines of reason 
and jus t i ce . Harris v . Harr is, 14 U. (2d) 96, 377 P . 2d 1007. In that case 
imposi t ion of a 30 day ja i l sentence was reversed under circumstances where 
the husband was paying $60.00 per month toward ch i ld support and spending 
$10.00 per month on the chi ldren instead of paying the $100.00 per month or-
dered. Failure to pay ch i ld support is a far more serious s i tuat ion than s imp ly 
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fa i l i ng to del iver property as in our case. There are no minor chi ldren or a l i -
mony payments involved in our case. P la in t i f f received substant ial property 
in the divorce decree ( R . 2 6 - 2 8 ) . The stock in question was a minor part of 
that property. The stock had no part icular value to p la int i f f apart f rom its value 
in money, sa id stock being readily avai lable for sale or purchase on the mar-
ket . 
POINT IV 
THE ORDER REQUIRING DELIVERY OF STOCK WAS IMPROPERLY ISSUED 
AND SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED BY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS. 
The divorce decree ordered defendant to del iver stock to p la int i f f , 
which he c la imed was disposed of prior to the entry of that order, thereby d i s -
abl ing h im before entry of the divorce decree f rom comply ing wi th that order. 
i 
Defendant bel ieved that he had thereafter sa t is f ied the obl igat ion by releasing 
his c l a im to a motorcyc le , boat, snow machine and other property awarded to 
h i m but retained by p la int i f f ( R . ) . Judge Leary found that he had not there- j 
by been rel ieved of his obl igat ion but found that he was not in contempt for 
fa i lure to deliver the s tock, thereby f ina l l y resolving any c la imed contempt 
ar is ing f rom the divorce decree i tse l f , (R . 8 2 ) . The order requiring del ivery 
of the stock was improper for various reasons including the fo l low ing : 
1 . P la in t i f f had a p la in , speedy and adequate remedy by asking ^ 
the Court to reduce her c l a i m to judgment and by execution under Rule 69, URCP. 
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The order of Judge Leary const i tuted the issuance of an extraordin-
ary wri t under Rule 65B, URCP, and/or consti tutes the issuances of an injunc-
t ion under Rule 65A, URCP, for the sole purpose of ass is t ing pla int i f f in c o l -
lect ing a debt- Under Rule 6 5 A ( e ) , URCP, an in juct ion may only be issued 
to prevent irreparable injury and under Rule 6 5 B ( a ) , URCP, an extraordinary 
wr i t should only be issued when " . . . no other p la in , speedy and adequate rem-
edy e x i s t s . " 
This case is quite s im i l a r to the s i tuat ion in Hinkins v . Sant i , 25 
U. (2d) 324, 481 P. 2d 53, where the defendant was sentenced to 5 days in 
j a i l for disobedience of a restraining order which prohibited h im f rom harassing 
his former gir l f r iend. In that case the Utah Supreme Court stated in part that 
"The propriety of issuing the order in the f i rs t instance would seem doubtful 
inasmuch as the p la int i f f ! s action for damages would appear to be an adequate 
remedy, and if not she had avai lable a statutory proceedings pursuant to the 
provisions of T i t le 77, ^ h a p . 4 , " (Secur i ty to Keep the Peace, emphasis added). 
As in that case, p la int i f f in our case has an adequate remedy in an action for 
damages for fa i lure to del iver the s tock, thereby rendering an extraordinary 
wr i t requiring del ivery of the stock unnecessary and contrary to the restr ict ions 
in Rule 65, URCP, l im i t i ng the issuance of injuct ions and other extraordinary 
wr i ts to s i tuat ions where no adequate remedy at law ex i s t s . 
9 
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2. The fa i lure of defendant to del iver the stock consti tutes a s ingle 
offense ( i f it is an o f fense) . The decision by Judge Leary that de fendants 
fa i lure to deliver the stock as ordered in the divorce decree did not const i tute 
a contempt of court was a f inal order and is res adjudicata, ( R . 64, 9 5 ) . The 
attempt by Judge Leary by the entry of a new order compel l ing del ivery of the < 
same stock to p la int i f f ( R . 7 1 , Par. 2) and the enforcement of that order by 
a second contempt proceeding based upon fai lure to del iver the same stock to p la in -
t i f f would const i tute placing defendant in double jeopardy in v io lat ion of A r t . 
I, Sec. 12 of the Utah Const i tu t ion, 77 -1 -10 , 7 7 - 8 - 8 , 7 7 - 8 - 9 , 77-24-10 through 
77-24-13 , UCA, 1953, and in v io la t ion of the f i f th amendment to the cons t i - i 
tut ion of the United Sta tes . Punishment for a contempt must be ent i re . The 
Court cannot reserve a part as was attempted in our case. See 17 A m . Jur. 
i 
Contempt Sec. 111 , and cases there c i t ed . 
3 . The f inding of contempt consti tutes imprisonment for debt, in 
v io lat ion of the provisions of A r t . I, Sec. 16, of the Utah Const i tu t ion. See i 
discussion in paragraph #1 above. See also State v . Reese, 43 U. 447, 135 
P. 270, (Bastardy case where defendant was imprisoned for fa i lure to give 
i 
secur i ty , which imprisonment the Supreme Court held to be lawful absent a 
showing that he was unable to give the securi ty required of h i m ) ; Bott v . Bot t , 
22 U. (2d) 368, 453 P. 2d 402, (contempt for fa i lure to pay monthly i ns ta l l - 4 
ments to wi fe held to real ly be al imony payments ( (se t t lement in l ieu of a l i -
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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mony)) and therefore not to const i tute imprisonment for debt ) ; 16 A m . Jur. 
2d 723 and 727, Const i tut ional Law, Sec. 386 and 388. Since the impr ison-
ment is for the sole purpose of enforcement of a debt, and is not for al imony 
or chiJd support, punishment for fa i lure to pay that debt (del iver stock) is a 
v io la t ion of A r t . I, Sec. 16 of the Utah Const i tu t ion. A judgment for a l imony 
is s imp ly a debt, whi th in the meaning of the const i tut ional prohibit ion against 
imprisonment for debt, and payment of the judgment cannot be enforced in a 
contempt proceeding. Davis v . Broughton, ( M o . App . ) 382 SW 2d 219. The 
award by the Court of the 10 shares of stock to p la int i f f was a distr ibut ion of 
assets acquired during the marr iage, const i tuted a debt owed by defendant to 
p la int i f f w i th in the meaning of the const i tut ional prohibi t ion against impr ison-
ment for debt. 
4 . Judge Leary was not ent i t led to order delivery of that stock w i t h -
outh an express f inding that defendant had the ab i l i ty to deliver the s tock . 
No such f inding was made by the Court, ( R . 7 0 - 7 1 ) . See also Brown v . Cook, 
123 U. 505, 260 P. 2d 544, 547; In re C l i f f s Es ta te , 108 U. 336, 159 P. 2d 
872, 874; State v . Bartholomew, 85 U. 94, 38 P. 2d 753; H i l l yard v . Dis t r ic t 
Court of Cache County, 68 U. 220, 249 P . 806; Ex Parte Gerber, 83 U. 4 4 1 , 
29 P. 2d 932; Parish v . McConkie , 84 U. 396, 35 P. 2d 1001. 
Since the order of Judge Leary again requiring del ivery of sa id stock 
was improperly issued, and the Court should not compound that error by af f i r -
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ming a f inding by Judge Croft that the defendant in contempt for fa i lure to c o m -
ply wi th the erronious order of Judge keary and impr isoning h im for that contempt. 
CONCLUSION 
The Cour t 's sentence of defendant to 30 days in ja i l for fa i lure to 
comply wi th a second order for del ivery of a trading stock to p la int i f f after de-
fendant had been found not gu i l ty of contempt of a prior order requiring del ivery 
of that same s tock, part icular ly without formal f ind ings, conclusions and judg-
ment , and without a f ind ing that defendant was able to del iver that stock was 
i l l e g a l , was not supported by a proper foundat ion, and must be vacated. The 
second order ( in junct ive or extraordinary re l ie f ) was improperly issued s ince 
p la int i f f had a p la in , speedy and adequate remedy at law by way of judgment 
and execut ion. Punishment for fa i lure to del iver the same stock consti tutes 
double jeopardy. The 30 day sentence was excess ive, part icular ly where the 
only object of the order was to col lect a debt and since no a l imony or ch i ld 
support were involved, and where p la int i f f herself was gui l ty of unequitable 
conduct in fa i l i ng to se l l the house and to pay 1/2 of the proceeds to defendant 
as ordered by the divorce decree, fa i lure to del iver to defendant the boat, mo-
torcycle and snow machine awarded to h i m by the Court, e t c . , ( R . 26-33, 
R. 38-42, R. 63-65, R. 7 0 - 7 1 ) . 
The sentence imposed upon defendant should be vacated and the 
case remanded, or in the a l ternat ive, the sentence imposed should be reduced. 
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Respectful ly submi t ted th is Z^Z%- day of September, 1976. 
[]^--^>^-€^LJi C, l/y-c^^A^e^ 
Aonald C. Barker, attorney for defendant 
2870 South State, Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 
84115; telephone 486-9636 
I hereby cert i fy that I caused three copies of the foregoing to be 
ma i led , postage prepaid, th is JQ day of September, 1976, to Jay D. E d -
monds, Attorney for p la in t i f f , 10 Exchange Place #309, Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 
84111. . , , ^ 
/ y c ^ v w ^ c ^ t&cz^s^^ 
Ronald C. Barker 
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